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After 9/11, The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) was created by presidential directive under the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Its goal was to consolidate different watchlists into one federal terrorism watchlist to contain information on people suspected to be involved in terrorism. This watchlist is called the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), or, more commonly, the Terrorist Watchlist. These post-9/11 efforts, all in the name of preventing terrorism, ushered in an era of anti-Muslim backlash, executive overreach, and a broad range of government abuses ranging from racial profiling, to warrantless wiretappings, illegal detentions, and secret deportations.
Watchlists have become the source of discrimination, racial, religious, and ethnic profiling, and an infringement upon the civil liberties of Muslim Americans.
The main subsets of the Terrorist Watchlist affecting Muslim Americans are:
Given that the post-9/11 anti-Muslim backlash ushered an era of executive overreach and a broad range of government abuses, such as racial profiling, warrantless wiretappings, illegal detentions, and secret deportations, all in the name of preventing terrorism, we ask the Biden Administration to:
1. Review and reduce watchlist
2. Create a substantive redress process
Created under President Bush’s Administration after the September 11th attacks, the Selectee List, according to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), includes “individuals who must undergo additional security screening before being permitted to board an aircraft.” Those selected are more commonly known as Secondary Security Screening Selectee, or SSSS on boarding passes, Selectee, or Automatic Selectee. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has stated that the list contains thousands of names, with people from certain countries subject to it by default.
The Selectee List has been criticized on civil liberties and due process grounds, due in part to its potential for ethnic, religious, economic, political, or racial profiling and discrimination. It has raised concerns about privacy and government secrecy and has been criticized as prone to false positives.
In 2002, following the September 11th attacks, President Bush issued 16 “Homeland Security Presidential Directives” to prevent future terrorist attacks, one of which established procedures for identifying, detecting, and tracking people who pose a threat to homeland security. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was directed to consolidate a watchlist to serve as a mainstream source of information. To monitor and maintain the list, the Transportation Security Agency (TSA) was also established. Together they became a national security system to limit an individual’s ability to enter or leave the U.S. once determined to pose a security risk, the “No Fly List.”
The No Fly List’s broad guiding principle are easily exploited due to the vague definition of “security risk.” The process of identifying individuals for the list was described by authorities from the FBI and Department of Justice (DOJ) as a “predictive assessment,” meaning that the list protects against what an individual may do rather than what someone has done. Once placed on the list, it is nearly impossible to be removed, This has created a system that is:
BACKGROUND
The Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) is the U.S. government’s central database on known or suspected international terrorists, and contains highly classified information provided by members of the Intelligence Community such as CIA, DIA, FBI, NSA, and many others.
As of February 2017, there are 1.6 million names in TIDE, including U.S. citizens and permanent residents. From the classified TIDE database, an unclassified, but sensitive, extract is provided to the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center, which compiles the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). This database, in turn, is used to compile the No Fly List and Selectee List.
Through our Emgage Action Michigan chapter, we are here to provide you updates in real-time on our legislative priorities, engagement with the Michigan State Government regarding the initiatives most important to our community, advocacy efforts, as well as the most crucial legislation we’re tracking.
CREATION
In 2002, following the September 11th attacks, President Bush issued 16 “Homeland Security Presidential Directives” to prevent future terrorist attacks, one of which established procedures for identifying, detecting, and tracking people who pose a threat to homeland security. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was directed to consolidate a watchlist to serve as a mainstream source of information. To monitor and maintain the list, the Transportation Security Agency (TSA) was also established. Together they became a national security system to limit an individual’s ability to enter or leave the U.S. once determined to pose a security risk, the “No Fly List.”
PROBLEM
The No Fly List’s broad guiding principle are easily exploited due to the vague definition of “security risk.” The process of identifying individuals for the list was described by authorities from the FBI and Department of Justice (DOJ) as a “predictive assessment,” meaning that the list protects against what an individual may do rather than what someone has done. Once placed on the list, it is nearly impossible to be removed, This has created a system that is:
CREATION
In 2002, following the September 11th attacks, President Bush issued 16 “Homeland Security Presidential Directives” to prevent future terrorist attacks, one of which established procedures for identifying, detecting, and tracking people who pose a threat to homeland security. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was directed to consolidate a watchlist to serve as a mainstream source of information. To monitor and maintain the list, the Transportation Security Agency (TSA) was also established. Together they became a national security system to limit an individual’s ability to enter or leave the U.S. once determined to pose a security risk, the “No Fly List.”
PROBLEM
The No Fly List’s broad guiding principle are easily exploited due to the vague definition of “security risk.” The process of identifying individuals for the list was described by authorities from the FBI and Department of Justice (DOJ) as a “predictive assessment,” meaning that the list protects against what an individual may do rather than what someone has done. Once placed on the list, it is nearly impossible to be removed, This has created a system that is:
CREATION
The Terrorist Watchlist (also known as the Terrorist Screening Database, or TSDB), contains thousands of records that are updated daily and shared with federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal law enforcement; intelligence community members; and international partners to ensure that individuals with links to terrorism are appropriately screened. The No Fly and Selectee Lists are two much smaller subsets of the Watchlist.
Urge President Biden to deliver on his campaign promises:
